Delhi suicide bombing signals need for a wider strategic review

A suicide bombing unfolded in Delhi on 10 November when Dr Umar-al-Nabi, a medical professional, triggered an explosion in his car near the Red Fort, killing 13 people and injuring more than 20.

Early assessments treated it as an accident, but investigators later confirmed that the vehicle had been packed with explosives. A video recovered from a phone that his brother had dumped in a pond near their home in Pulwama shows he had planned the attack. Reports also point to foreign handlers linked to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and possibly Turkey.

Multiple agencies, including the Delhi Police and the National Investigation Agency (NIA), are still piecing together the details. The broad contours are clear, though several questions remain.

One concerns Jawad Ahmed Siddiqui, founder-chancellor of Al-Falah University, who has been detained by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) on charges of laundering ₹415 crore and operating nine shell companies.

The ED says the university fabricated UGC approvals and misled students. Since the university was set up in 2014, the natural question is how such large-scale fraud went undetected for so long.

Another matter relates to the 13 November explosion inside a police station in Srinagar that killed nine and injured 32. The blast occurred amid improperly stored explosives that had been recovered earlier.

Basic protocols prohibit storing explosives in public-facing areas, let alone inside a police station.

Once the Delhi investigation is complete, the government should release a white paper explaining what happened and what must be done to prevent similar attacks. This is something that should have been done after the Pulwama attack in 2019 and after every major incident since.

The larger question is how a trained doctor, that too a college topper from Jammu and Kashmir whose profession is to save lives, came to believe he was justified in killing innocent people.

News reports point to other medical professionals, including a woman doctor who helped fund the car, who appear to have been part of a group planning the attack.

The scale of preparation is becoming clearer. On 9 November, J&K Police and their Haryana counterparts seized 350 kg of explosives, assault rifles, timing devices and ammunition from a house in Faridabad.

The next day, they raided another property in the same locality and recovered an extraordinary 2,563 kg of explosives, chemicals, reagents and electronic circuits. According to police, the premises had been rented by a doctor from Pulwama, the same district where in 2019 a man rammed his car rigged with explosives into a bus, killing 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans.

There is a key difference between Pulwama and the Delhi attack. In 2019, India quickly established a Pakistan link and retaliated.

That response did not stop Pakistan from exporting terror, as the recent Pahalgam attack showed. India had responded militarily to the Pahalgam attack, prompting Pakistan to ask for a ceasefire.

In the Delhi case, the government has so far taken a methodical approach. Investigations are ongoing and the Ministry of External Affairs has refrained from publicly blaming Pakistan.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Moscow on Tuesday, 18 November, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar underscored that combating terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations” is an obligation for every state, Pakistan included.

Pakistan, by contrast, reacted sharply to its own 10 November suicide attack in Islamabad, which killed 12 and injured 36. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) faction, claimed responsibility, yet Pakistan’s leadership quickly pointed fingers at India.

Its defense minister Khawaja Asif declared that the country was in “a state of war,” while the interior minister alleged involvement of “India-backed elements” and “Afghan Taliban proxies”. Pakistan has also begun referring to the Taliban government in Kabul as “India-backed”.

On 11 November, India “unequivocally” rejected the “baseless and unfounded allegations” being made “by an obviously delirious Pakistani leadership.”

Even so, New Delhi could have first issued a statement condemning the Islamabad attack and expressing condolences, before responding to Pakistan’s accusations.

A direct war between India and Pakistan remains unlikely. Still, some public remarks have raised concern. On 16 November, India’s army chief General Upendra Dwivedi described the May air engagement as an “88-hour trailer” and warned Pakistan that it must stop cross-border terrorism if it wants to “stay on the world map”.

Days later, Pakistan’s defense minister said an “all-out war” could not be ruled out.

Pakistan’s decision to link India to the Islamabad attack makes it necessary to view developments through a wider regional frame. After the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) assumed it would wield influence in Kabul. When the Taliban resisted, relations deteriorated, and Pakistan now speaks of an “India-backed” Taliban, a significant shift.

Alongside this, Bangladesh is entering a period of turbulence following the sentencing of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina and elections scheduled for February 2026. Taking these developments together, India must assess the emerging quadrilateral dynamic involving India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

A decade after the announcement of India’s “Neighborhood First” policy in 2014, the region presents a far more complex landscape. It is time to ask whether the policy needs course correction.