Iran plays for time as Trump runs out of options

There is no sign of any early end to the war, with US President Donald Trump having painted himself into a corner, with generous help from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who at present is working hard to survive politically as the October election approaches. Netanyahu’s public rejection of Trump’s Gaza plan points to a widening divide between the two.

Trump has repeatedly asserted that Iran was “begging” for talks. On 3 August, he said talks with Iran were going on, adding that it was the “last chance” for Tehran to sign “a good document.” By a “good document,” Trump clearly means that Iran has to sign on the dotted line.

Iran, on the contrary, denied that talks were taking place or were about to take place.

Trump’s eagerness for talks has also led him to link progress over the Strait of Hormuz with wider negotiations. The implication has been that the ongoing Iran-Oman talks could lead to the reopening of the strait and, in turn, open the way for broader talks with Iran.

Washington may be keeping in touch with Oman. However, Tehran has made it clear that the talks with Oman are focused on arrangements concerning the Strait of Hormuz and do not amount to direct negotiations with the US, and that the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until Washington delivers on certain items in the MoU.

In short, Iran is exuding confidence and defiance, based on the calculation that it can afford to outlast Trump’s threats. Moreover, if Trump were to resume heavy bombing, the Iranian leadership appears confident that it can carry on the war for weeks or even months, keeping in view the US midterm elections in November. The war has already become a political liability for Trump, and significant Democratic gains in Congress could severely restrict his freedom of action during the remaining two years of his presidency.

Iran must also be closely monitoring the American media. It would certainly have noticed The New York Times report of 8 August headlined “The US Is Burning Through Weapons in Iran.”

The salient points in the report are:

a) White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt says that the US has more than enough firepower to carry out any operation the President decides, at any place or time. Military experts, however, are considerably less sanguine about US weapons stocks.

b) The war has sharply depleted stocks of Patriot interceptor missiles. The US has used more than 1,500 Patriot interceptors since the war began, leaving fewer than 1,700 in its inventory. Even with accelerated production, replenishing those stocks could take more than two years.

c) The pressure on US weapons stocks has implications for military commitments elsewhere, including Europe and Asia.

d) The Pentagon has large stocks of guided munitions, but many have to be delivered by aircraft operating closer to their targets, increasing the risk to the aircraft.

e) Iran would also have taken note of the difficulties the administration has faced in securing additional funding for the war. Trump has sought tens of billions of dollars in additional defense spending for the Iran conflict, while also asking Congress to approve a $1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027. Opposition to the war has grown in Congress, including among some Republican lawmakers.

There are indications that the Iranian leadership is fortifying itself. Mohsen Rezaei, 71, a military commander who fought in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 and who has recently been appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has clearly indicated that Washington must deliver on the commitments it made in the memorandum of understanding signed in June. Rezaei has been consistently skeptical of negotiations with Washington and accused the US of violating the agreement soon after it was concluded.

Another important matter is the condition of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. There have been persistent reports about the seriousness of the injuries he suffered in the 28 February attack that killed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and he has not appeared publicly since taking office.

Iranian state media, however, reported that President Masoud Pezeshkian met Khamenei in late July to discuss military and economic matters. It had earlier reported another meeting between the two lasting several hours.

The key demands of Iran are:

a) lifting the blockade of Iranian ports and withdrawing the forces deployed by the US Central Command for that purpose;

b) lifting sanctions on the sale of Iranian oil;

c) releasing Iran’s frozen funds;

d) an end to Trump’s threats against Iran; and

e) an end to Israeli attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Tehran must also be following closely developments in Israel, where Netanyahu has been pushed by his right-wing supporters and potential opponents into taking a hard line on Gaza and publicly disagreeing with Trump.

Netanyahu has rejected Trump’s latest 15-point plan for Gaza, insisting that Israeli forces will not withdraw until Hamas is fully disarmed. Trump, who chairs the Board of Peace overseeing the Gaza process, wants the plan to move forward. He might have calculated that the success of the Board would enhance his credentials for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Trump has the option of putting pressure on Netanyahu to stop attacks on Lebanon by threatening, privately or publicly, to restrict arms supplies. Israel’s military, reputedly the strongest in the region, nevertheless remains heavily dependent on Washington for arms and diplomatic support.

Iran, hitherto good at playing chess with Trump, might conclude that if Trump is unable or unwilling to compel Netanyahu to do his bidding, it would still be in Iran’s interest to cut a deal.

More recently, however, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) asserting its clout, Iran too has started playing poker like Trump.

One byproduct of this war is the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey on 7 August in the holy city of Mecca, at the summit level. The location is significant, and some commentators have already compared it with NATO, or described it as the possible beginning of an “Islamic NATO,” with other countries, including Egypt, potentially joining later. Turkey itself has said Egypt could be among the countries to join an expanded grouping.

The pact is intended to provide collective deterrence against any act of aggression by stipulating that an armed attack against any one of the three would be regarded as an attack on all. However, the agreement does not spell out what specific military action each country would be required to take.

Which country might be the aggressor? Iran or Israel? Before attempting to answer that question, we need to look at the geopolitical background to this pact.

On 9 September 2025, Israel attacked Qatar, targeting Hamas officials in Doha who were involved in negotiations being mediated by Qatar. The attack shocked the Gulf states and raised uncomfortable questions about the extent to which an American security presence could protect them from military action by another US ally.

The attack was carried out by an F-15, from the Red Sea without crossing Saudi air space; even more importantly, it used sophisticated missiles unstoppable by THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) or PATRIOT (Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept on Target) defense systems.

The same type of attack by Israel assassinated Iran’s supreme leader and others on 28 February.

Nine days after Israel’s attack on Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense treaty. The agreement stated that aggression against either country would be considered aggression against both.

The Mecca pact now takes that process considerably further. It provides for high-level political and military coordination, a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, joint military exercises and much deeper defense-industry cooperation, including in unmanned systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence.

The full implications are not yet clear.

Israel is obviously seen as a potential threat by all three. At the same time, the immediate context for the agreement includes Iranian missile attacks on Gulf states. Turkey has clarified, for what it is worth, that the pact is not targeted against Iran or any other particular country.

Interestingly, Iran itself has publicly said it sees no reason to fear the pact and has suggested that greater regional self-reliance in security could be positive, provided such arrangements address what Tehran regards as the real sources of insecurity.

Iran has pointed out that Saudi Arabia cannot be safe if the US resumes attack on Iran, despite the Mecca pact.

India needs to take the pact seriously.

Pakistan has now acquired a formal trilateral security framework with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It would be premature to assume that either country would automatically join Pakistan in a future confrontation with India, since the agreement does not make clear how its collective-defense clause would operate in such circumstances.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia could provide Pakistan with financial and diplomatic support, including at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and other forums, while Turkey already has close defense ties with Islamabad and could provide military or technological support.

As argued repeatedly in these columns by me, it is high time India seriously explored a smarter policy towards Pakistan. Slogans such as “blood and water cannot flow together” or “terror and talks cannot go together” do not amount to policy.