- | 5:30 pm
The attack on Iran and the march of folly
The war launched by Israel and the United States raises difficult questions about the collapse of diplomacy, the strategic logic of escalation, and the risks now facing the wider region.
The 28 February attack on Iran by Israel and the US, or more precisely by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump, is a classic example of a war of choice, with potentially disastrous consequences for all three belligerents and for the wider world.
In essence, this is Netanyahu’s war, and he has persuaded Trump to join it. No significant US national interest appears to be involved. By aligning himself with Netanyahu in this conflict, Trump may have compromised America’s own strategic interests.
An immediate question is whether the war can last for the “four weeks” mentioned by Trump.
Professor John Mearsheimer has argued convincingly that Netanyahu prevailed upon Trump, who “boxed himself into a corner” by joining a war he is likely to lose.
The diplomatic background to the war
On 6 February, the US and Iran began talks in Muscat, facilitated, and to some extent mediated, by Oman, a country notable for its persistent efforts at conflict resolution.
The US negotiators were Steve Witkoff, Trump’s golf partner and fellow real estate developer, and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. Notably absent from the American delegation was any professional diplomat.
Iran was represented by foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, who is fluent in English and holds a doctorate from the University of Kent. Oman’s foreign minister Badr Al Busaidi acted as mediator.
On 11 February, Netanyahu visited the White House, where he and Trump almost certainly discussed the ongoing negotiations.
On 13 February, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated at the Munich Security Conference that the “Shia clerics” could not be trusted.
On 27 February, talks held at the Omani embassy in Geneva concluded.
On 28 February, foreign minister Al Busaidi visited Washington and briefed Vice President J.D. Vance on what had been agreed in Geneva.
Hours later, Israel attacked Iran, followed by the US.
Al Busaidi expressed shock and subsequently gave an interview to the American television network CBS describing what had been agreed on 27 February.
According to him, Iran agreed to zero enrichment, zero stockpiling of nuclear material, and to down-blend existing uranium irreversibly so that it could not be used for weapons production. Iran also pledged to “never, ever” seek nuclear weapons.
There is no compelling reason to disbelieve Al Busaidi.
In short, Trump appears to have secured a deal even more favorable than the 2015 Obama agreement. He could have claimed victory as the “master deal-maker,” revoked sanctions on Iran, and potentially generated commercial opportunities for US firms, including those connected to his own business interests.
Why, then, did Trump choose war when peace appeared more advantageous?
Mearsheimer’s argument that Netanyahu exercised decisive influence over Trump carries weight.
He attributes that influence partly to Trump’s reluctance to confront the powerful Jewish lobby in the US. Yet Trump has in the past disregarded Netanyahu’s objections, for instance by advancing proposals for an international stabilization force in Gaza and pressing for a ceasefire even without Hamas agreeing to disarm.
Mearsheimer’s explanation therefore may not be sufficient.
Another explanation circulating in American media is that Trump sought a war to divert attention from the Epstein file, noting that internet searches on the issue have declined sharply. Whether this alone would justify such a decision is debatable.
Another possibility has also been suggested. Was Epstein used by a foreign intelligence agency, possibly Mossad, which might possess the full file and therefore be able to influence which portions of it become public?
More evidence would be needed before reaching any firm conclusion.
The assassination of the Ayatollah
We note with horror the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the evident satisfaction expressed in Washington and Tel Aviv. Equally troubling is the silence of institutions and groupings such as the European Union, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and much of the Global South, none of which have openly condemned the killing.
Trump has also acted irresponsibly and illegally in abducting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Celia, while endorsing Netanyahu’s killing of the Ayatollah.
In democratic systems, the executive, legislature, and judiciary are expected to check one another when authority is exceeded.
In the case of tariffs, the US Supreme Court eventually constrained executive action.
Under Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution, only Congress has the authority to declare war. The president, as commander-in-chief, may repel attacks against the US.
In this instance, Iran had not attacked the US. By launching an attack, Trump may therefore have violated the Constitution.
Democrats challenged Trump’s authority in the Senate, but their resolution was defeated 53–47. Even if it had passed, Trump could have vetoed it, and Democrats would likely have struggled to secure the two-thirds majority required to override the veto.
For now, Congress appears unwilling to challenge Trump’s authority. The situation could change after the midterm elections in November.
Strategic objectives of the belligerents
Netanyahu appears determined to do in Iran what Israel has done in Gaza. The death toll has already exceeded 1,000 within five days.
His stated objective of regime change need not be taken entirely at face value, although he would doubtless welcome the return of crown prince Reza Pahlavi.
Netanyahu’s broader objective may be to establish Israel as the dominant regional power while Iran descends into instability. In such a scenario, Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arab minorities could rise against an increasingly weakened central government in Tehran.
Of Iran’s population of roughly 90 million, about 10% are Kurds. Many Kurdish groups have long been in conflict with the Iranian state and have reportedly received support from Mossad.
Trump has reportedly spoken with a Kurdish leader, and official denials from the White House regarding arms transfers should be treated with caution.
Saudi Arabia had been close to normalizing relations with Israel before the events of 7 October 2023. Once the present crisis subsides, normalization could resume, potentially allowing Israel to consolidate control over the occupied territories and take more land from Syria and Jordan, in furtherance of the Greater Israel project propounded by David Ben Gurion way back in 1918.
Iran’s strategy
Iran appears to have adopted a three-pronged strategy.
First, it is attacking Israel with drones and missiles.
Second, it is targeting US bases and diplomatic missions in the region.
Third, it is seeking to impose economic costs on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states by striking infrastructure such as hotels, airports, and hydrocarbon facilities.
Facilities reportedly affected include the Aramco complex in Saudi Arabia, the LNG terminal in Qatar, and the BAPCO refinery in Bahrain. Oil and gas prices have surged, and global stock markets have reacted sharply.
Iran has also effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of global oil and gas shipments pass.
The US has closed its diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while Western countries have advised their citizens to leave the region.
Iran appears to calculate that Gulf states will press Washington to end the war.
Confusion in Washington
Statements from Trump and his senior officials have been notably inconsistent.
Trump has said the attack was intended to pre-empt an Iranian strike and claimed that Iran was not negotiating seriously.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has suggested that Israel was prepared to attack regardless of US approval and that Iran would inevitably retaliate against the US once Israel acted.
Rubio’s remarks raise an obvious question: why was Israel in such a hurry to strike?
One explanation may be that Mossad had been tracking the movements of Ayatollah Khamenei and senior Iranian commanders for months. When they were located together, Israel may have judged that the opportunity could not be missed.
India’s difficult position
India faces a particularly complex challenge.
About 10 million Indian nationals live in the Gulf region, many in areas directly affected by the conflict.
Western countries have begun evacuating their citizens. For India, evacuating such a large population would be logistically impossible, and many expatriate Indians would likely refuse to leave.
The Ministry of External Affairs should therefore consider limited evacuations for the elderly and vulnerable while maintaining contingency planning.
When an Iranian naval vessel participating in multinational exercises in Visakhapatnam was torpedoed by the US Navy, India could have issued a statement urging all parties to preserve the Indo-Pacific as a zone of peace governed by international law.
It is commendable that the Indian Navy conducted search-and-rescue operations.
Sri Lanka’s navy also deserves recognition for rescuing more than 30 survivors.
The US Secretary of War Hegseth boasted that it was the first torpedoing after World War 2. He is wrong. The Royal Navy did it in the 1982 Falklands war.
So how long will the war last?
If Trump retains control over the decision-making process, the war could end before his proposed meeting with Xi Jinping on 31 March.
The White House has announced the visit for 31 March to 2 April, although Beijing has yet to confirm it.
China agreed in 2021 to invest $400 billion in Iran over 25 years in exchange for long-term oil supplies. If the war continues, it is difficult to see how Trump could conduct productive talks in Beijing.
He may therefore choose to “declare victory” before the visit, particularly as rising oil prices and falling stock markets increase pressure on the US administration.
Trump’s latest statements, including claims that he may influence the choice of Iran’s next Supreme Leader, calls for the Iranian military to surrender, and suggestions that Iranian diplomats should seek asylum, appear to echo Netanyahu’s talking points.
India is already experiencing the consequences of the conflict through rising energy prices and disruptions in LNG supplies from Qatar.
Managing the safety of millions of Indian citizens in the region while safeguarding national energy security will require careful diplomacy.
Wars of choice often begin with confidence but rarely end according to plan.
As former British prime minister Winston Churchill wrote in My Early Life (1930):
“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that any one who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events….”



