Trump’s Ukraine peace gamble leaves Kyiv with fewer choices

US President Donald Trump’s relentless diplomatic push for a ceasefire and negotiated end to the war that began with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion in February 2022 is now at an inflection point.

Trump appears eager to secure what he hopes will be another “peace settlement” to add to his record and strengthen his credentials for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize, for which nominations close at the end of January. Whether he will succeed remains uncertain.

The unfolding tragedy has become more convoluted lately, with twists that recall a crime novel by Agatha Christie or a case straight out of Sherlock Holmes.

Before assessing the current situation, we need to step back and consider the broader context.

What we are effectively witnessing are two wars at once: Russia’s war against Ukraine and a broader confrontation between NATO and Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi on 4-5 December is expected to include a briefing to Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the war in Ukraine and the search for a diplomatic resolution.

Ahead of Putin’s arrival, the German, French and British envoys on 1 December, published an article in the Times of India using rather harsh language on Putin’s actions.

India’s ministry of external affairs put out a statement saying that the article was “inappropriate.”

The episode reflects anxiety within the so-called Coalition of the Willing (COW) about being left out of any eventual settlement.

Some European voices, consumed by hostility toward Putin, seem ready to fight Russia “to the last Ukrainian.” They demand no ground troops of their own, yet warn of an inevitable attack on NATO countries if Russia prevails.

In Moscow’s telling, the root cause of the conflict lies in NATO’s steady expansion eastward, creeping closer to Russia’s borders since 1999 when Russia under Boris Yeltsin was politically and economically weak.

Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin, initially sought cordial ties with the West. His hopes were dashed when Washington backed NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit declaration that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO” despite his public objections in 2007–08.

In 2014, when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia after the Maidan uprising, which in Moscow and some Western circles is still portrayed as having enjoyed at least tacit Western backing, Russia moved to annex Crimea, a region administratively transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet republic in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev.

Western sanctions failed to force Moscow’s hand. For Russia the risk was existential: giving up Crimea meant losing its access to the warm-water port that had served the Russian navy since the late eighteenth century.

When Volodymyr Zelensky, a comedian with no prior political experience, was elected Ukraine President in 2019, he single-mindedly pursued NATO membership.

Encouraged by then US president Joe Biden, who should have understood the risks, Zelensky’s quest became the principal trigger for Russia’s decision to launch what it called a “special military operation to de-Nazify” Ukraine in February 2022.

It is true that Putin fired the first shots. Yet Biden could have heeded Moscow’s December 2021 request for a treaty to address its core security concerns.

Instead, Biden, an ardent practitioner of “public diplomacy,” rejected the bid publicly.

He insisted Ukraine had every right to determine its own defense policy.

In 1962, when the Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba, then US president John F. Kennedy did not stand on Cuba’s formal right to make that choice.

He demanded immediate removal of the weapons. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev displayed the diplomatic maturity that today’s leaders seem to lack.

After the invasion, Biden took the lead, and Europe followed, to impose sanctions and began sending military and financial aid to Kyiv, expecting that Russia’s rouble would turn to “rubble,” that its economy would be severely weakened and that Putin’s regime might not survive intact.

We are left to conclude that the three men most responsible for this war are Biden, Putin, and Zelensky, listed alphabetically, and not according to their level of guilt.

Turning to recent developments, Trump moved to pause and leverage US military aid to Ukraine and began seeking a diplomatic resolution, , seemingly soft toward Putin.

On 20 November, a 28-point plan leaked to the media forced a near ultimatum on Ukraine: respond by Thanksgiving Day (27 November).

The deadline was suddenly waived, with Trump later clarifying that nothing was final.

The plan called for Ukraine to fully withdraw from Donbass and legally cede sovereignty over Crimea, Donbass and parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, or roughly a fifth of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory.

The plan would limit Ukraine’s military to 600,000 troops in peacetime from the current 900,000. It would bar Ukraine from possessing long-range missiles. The deal would forbid foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. Frozen Russian central bank assets, estimated at $100 billion and held in Europe, would be used to rebuild Ukraine under US-led projects. Ukraine would formally forswear any bid to join NATO and NATO would commit not to admit it.

The key question is how was the 28-point plan drafted? Here, chronology might help:
13 October: Trump announces he might give Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.
16 October: Putin calls Trump.
17 October: Trump receives Zelensky at the White House and tells his he won’t get Tomahawk missiles.
22 October: A frustrated Trump, irritated by Putin’s slow response to ceasefire proposals repeatedly made, announces sanctions on two Russian companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, which together account a large accounting for 50% of Russia’s oil exports, to be effective from 21 November, generating much jubilation in Ukraine and Europe, especially among CoW.

Putin put out: “No-self-respecting country ever does anything under pressure.”

24 October: Kiril Dimitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, reaches Miami for talks with Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. The State Department lifted sanctions on him so that he could come.

We do not know for how long Dimitriev was in Miami.

20 November: The 28-point plan is leaked to media, probably by Dimitriev, and the same day the US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll reaches Kyiv for talks with the Ukrainian military.

Questions immediately arose about whether the plan was drafted with Ukrainian consent.

Critics in Europe dismissed it as Moscow’s wish list.

The White House countered by saying Kyiv had been involved before the plan was finalized.

We may recall Putin’s call to Trump one day before he met Zelensky.

Bloomberg has put out the recorded conversation, where Witkoff advised Putin’s aide to make the call and let Trump know that giving Tomahawk missiles will entail serious consequences.

Trump, predictably has defended Witkoff.

A close read of the leaked plan suggests some Ukrainian engagement. Russia is unlikely to accept using its frozen funds to rebuild Ukraine, nor agree to a reduced Ukrainian military of 600,000 troops in peace time. Ukraine had about 250,000 in 2022 before the war started.

Indeed, Zelensky said the plan could serve as a starting point. The so-called Coalition of the Willing in Europe got upset and rushed consultations, producing a revised 28-point draft. That may deserve attention, but we will leave it aside for now.

Later meetings in Geneva between the US and Ukraine reportedly yielded a new draft. Moscow indicated it could serve as ‘a basis for starting the talks,’ although it declared Zelensky illegitimate as an interlocutor.

Zelensky signaled that he wanted a discussion with Trump about territory, NATO membership and security guarantees.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is embroiled in a domestic political storm. On 28 November, Zelensky’s chief counselor Andriy Yermak, who was to lead the delegation to Washington, resigned after a corruption watchdog raided his residence in connection with a $100 million bribe linked to power-infrastructure contracts.

There is now a growing perception in Ukraine over Zelensky’s own dealings, including property holdings in Cyprus. Some members of Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, are reportedly planning to go to the US to meet Trump and seek his support for toppling Zelensky.

Taken together it seems clear that Trump understands that despite European support, Ukraine cannot withstand Russian military pressure, let alone reclaim lost territory. European support appears to be waning.

Efforts supported by the EU Commission to use Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction are faltering. Belgium, where most funds are held, opposes the plan and favors a loan from the EU.

Any proposal for such a loan will face resistance from Hungary and Slovakia, opposed to aiding Ukraine, and from budget-strained countries, say, Germany.

The latest is that talks between Ukraine and the US in Miami have concluded and Trump has claimed that peace might be round the corner.

Trump also indicated willingness to meet Putin with or without Zelensky if both sides agree.

Steve Witkoff and Kushner had a 5-hour meeting with Putin on 2 December. Kremlin has stated that there was no agreement, though the talks were “constructive”. The main sticking point is about territory.

Zelensky has warned against dealing behind Ukraine’s back.

Trump has said that the war is “a mess.”

Looking ahead there are two possible outcomes.

One: negotiations fail, Ukraine’s energy network collapses further, Zelensky is replaced, and Kyiv accepts terms set by Trump and Putin.

Two: increased sanctions, more European and perhaps US arms to Ukraine, paid for by Europe, destabilize Russia. Under pressure Moscow agrees to terms shaped by Trump, Europe and Kyiv.

The first outcome seems more probable.