Modi 3.0’s ‘Neighborhood First’ policy at a glance

Last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi marked three months into his third term, providing an opportunity to reflect on India’s foreign policy thus far.

Starting with South Asia, Modi had emphasized his ‘Neighborhood First’ policy even before his first term began in 2014 by inviting all heads of states in the subcontinent to his inauguration. All attended the event that some scholars likened to a mini-SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation).

Unexpectedly, after the 18th SAARC meeting in Kathmandu in November 2014, no further summits were held.

The next summit, scheduled in Pakistan for 2016, was boycotted by India following the Uri attack in September that year, with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka also withdrawing. Consequently, SAARC is now languishing without remedy.

The success of any Neighborhood First policy hinges on cooperation from neighboring countries, a fundamental yet often overlooked aspect of diplomacy. Hence, Modi’s Neighborhood First policy’s mixed results are not solely his responsibility.

India under Modi has preferred bilateral engagements over multilateral ones in the subcontinent.

Bangladesh

Muhammad Yunus, the 84-year-old interim Prime Minister of Bangladesh and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, emphasized on 11 September his commitment to fostering “strong relationships” with India and other neighbors.  He added, pointedly, that the ties must be rooted in “fairness and equality”.

The most intractable issue between the two neighbors is former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s political asylum in India.

Yunus has publicly stated that she could remain in India until Dhaka requests her extradition, provided she remains politically inactive.

With serious charges, including murder, pending against her, India may soon face an extradition request. How will New Delhi respond?

Retired officials, including former high commissioners to Bangladesh, have argued against extraditing Hasina, who has been ‘a great friend’.

The 2013 extradition treaty does provide for extradition of criminals provided the condition of ‘dual criminality’—an offence must be punishable in both countries—is satisfied. Another requirement is that the offence should be serious enough to warrant at least one year of imprisonment.

The charges against Hasina obviously satisfy the conditions.

However, this is more a political than a legal matter.  This columnist previously argued for relocating Hasina to another country as early as possible to prevent potential diplomatic fallout

I was first secretary in Tehran when President Jimmy Carter’s decision to grant asylum to the Shah caused some young militants to take over the US embassy with consequences too well known to be detailed.

It is not being predicted that something similar will happen in Bangladesh if Hasina remains in India. However, it can be said with reasonable certainty that bilateral relations will get worse, and New Delhi needs to consider the implications for the security of the over 13 million Hindus there and their places of worship.

Temples might be attacked as Durga Puja nears not only by rabid extremists but also by those who want to spoil ties with India, and those possibly linked to Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence (ISI).

Nostalgia cannot be the basis of foreign policy. It has been reported that Yunus has asked for a meeting with Modi, and that he is still awaiting a reply. A one-on-one meeting, unless diplomats have properly prepared an agreed declaration in advance, can be disastrous.

However, an online meeting, discreetly arranged, can prove useful.

After the meeting, there should be a public announcement if only it was successful.

The economic impact of the crisis in relations between the two neighbors needs to be studied.

Will the industry lobbies Ficci, CII, and the others undertake it?

Sri Lanka

Colombo and New Delhi have maintained strong relations, despite China’s efforts to draw Sri Lanka closer to it.

Having served in Sri Lanka as deputy high commissioner, I believe that Colombo benefits from a stance of vague non-alignment, leaning slightly towards India given geopolitical and cultural realities.  India will remain the first responder in the event of any natural calamity there.

Bilateral relations, whether economic, cultural, or defense cooperation, are also on the upswing.

Maldives

In October 2023, Mohammed Muizzu, a 45-year-old British-educated civil engineer, won the presidential election in the Maldives, unseating Ibrahim Mohammed Solih, who had been in office since 2018.

Muizzu’s victory posed a diplomatic challenge for India, as his campaign included an “India Out” promise, necessitating some course correction.

We do not know whether New Delhi tried to figure out the best course of action. In fact, India chose a course that aggravated the discord. After ignoring the demand to withdraw Indian military personnel for a while, New Delhi was compelled to comply.

Muizzu sought to make his first official visit to India, but unresolved ‘scheduling problems’ led him instead to Turkey, and subsequently to China, where President Xi Jinping warmly received him. China derived much malicious pleasure and considerable advantage from India’s cold-shouldering of Muizzu.

Acknowledging its mistake, New Delhi has since made amends, and Muizzu is expected to visit India soon. Earlier, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar paid a three-day visit to Maldives.

Similarly to Sri Lanka, the Maldives must also balance maintaining strong ties with India while not estranging China. It is essential for India to demonstrate an understanding of the sensitivities of its smaller neighbors.

Pakistan

Islamabad is due to host the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) heads of government meeting on 15-16 October. We do not know whether Modi will attend.

Pakistan is a dysfunctional democracy. Its policy towards India, China, and the US is decided by the military, irrespective of the civilian government in office.

The military can maintain its hold on power only by projecting India as a permanent threat and that it-the military-alone can protect the country.

From time to time, the ISI permits or arranges for terrorist attacks across the line of control.

Given the military’s dominant role in Pakistan, which perpetuates the image of India as a threat to maintain its power, New Delhi needs to devise a policy that encourages Pakistan to act responsibly.

India has not yet shown that it has done that.

Simplistic approaches like the mantra: ‘no talks till Pakistan stops terrorism’ are inadequate.

Nor should foreign policy be subordinated to seeking domestic political advantages. Even as the military controls the levers of power in Pakistan, there is a good deal India can do to weaken its hold.

For example, thousands of Pakistanis want to visit India, but to get a visa is difficult. Is it not better for the Pakistanis to come to India and witness the progress India has made?

When Pakistan faced devastating floods in 2022, the UN Secretary General convened a conference of donors that India did not attend.

It would have been a good diplomatic move to have offered to send tomatoes and onions by road as their prices were going up.

Pakistan had stopped road transport of goods after the 2019 abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. Islamabad may or may not have agreed to re-open the road traffic, but the people of Pakistan would have noted India’s good neighborly gesture.

Recall that in 2010 India offered $25 million for flood relief.

Afghanistan

Following the disastrous withdrawal of US troops by President Joe Biden in 2021, the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan. The Taliban’s extremist ideology, marked by a harsh patriarchy that denies women’s rights, poses challenges. Nevertheless, New Delhi should have engaged with the regime to advocate for women’s rights.

For instance, Afghanistan faced shortages of food and medicine. The Indira Gandhi Children’s Hospital, the largest children’s hospital in Afghanistan established in 1969, was struggling with a lack of medical supplies and equipment due to sanctions post-Taliban takeover.

New Delhi could have proposed sending medicines and doctors to Afghanistan, on the condition that Afghan women staff be allowed to work freely, without restrictions.

While the Taliban’s acceptance of the offer was uncertain, India’s gesture could have reinforced its commitment to the Afghan people.

Meanwhile, China has appointed an ambassador to Kabul and entered into agreements to mine lithium and other resources, whereas India maintains only a technical mission in the Afghan capital.

Nepal

Nepal, a landlocked neighbor with deep cultural ties to India, maintains strong bilateral relations despite China’s efforts to sway it away. The importance of respecting the sensitivities of smaller neighbors is crucial here.

Bhutan

China has persistently sought to establish a resident embassy in Bhutan. However, Bhutan has resisted, preferring not to host embassies from any of the Permanent-5 members of the UN Security Council.

In summary, the Neighborhood First policy requires reassessment and potential course corrections.

Discussing India’s relationships with the US, Russia, China, the European Union, and its aspirations for Great Power status, including a seat on the Security Council, warrants a separate discussion.