The previous column examined the realignment of geopolitical forces, initiated largely, though not entirely controlled, by US President Donald Trump.

The latest development is a reported proposal by Russian President Vladimir Putin for a G3 meeting with Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen on 18–19 November 2026. Trump is likely to agree.

We may presume that Putin consulted Xi before speaking to Trump on 9 October, when the two agreed that Russia would supply diesel to the US. Such supplies could provide badly needed relief ahead of the midterm elections, which, by current indications, Trump is likely to lose. A defeat would leave him facing the prospect of spending his final two years in office as a lame-duck president.

Recognizing the US’ growing unreliability as an ally, Qatar, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan have signed a memorandum of understanding to deepen defense industry cooperation. Earlier, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Mecca defense pact in August 2026.

All the countries involved are Muslim-majority states, with Pakistan and Turkey common to both arrangements.

How, then, should India navigate these increasingly treacherous geopolitical and geoeconomic waters? We should begin by identifying some serious errors of judgment by Indian policymakers.

Overdependence on the US

The most consequential mistake has been India’s excessive dependence on the US, putting too many eggs in the American basket.

The joint statement issued during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s February 2025 visit to Washington illustrates the problem.

Trump, an enthusiastic salesman for the American military-industrial-congressional complex, agreed with Modi to sign a new 10-year framework for the US-India Major Defense Partnership. The agreement was signed on 31 October 2025.

Yet Washington has stalled the bilateral trade agreement (BTA), which the two leaders had agreed to conclude by the fall of 2025. It has also obstructed progress by imposing tariffs on India on questionable grounds, including allegations of forced labor and overcapacity.

Trump imposed tariffs on India for purchasing Russian oil while refraining from similar measures against China, which bought more Russian oil than India.

Any BTA requires give and take. Trump, however, remains wedded to an anachronistic, autarkic economic philosophy. He wants to take without giving.

He encourages foreign companies to invest in the US while discouraging American companies from investing abroad.

Apple is a case in point.

Referring to Apple’s pledge to spend $500 billion in the US, Trump recounted a conversation with CEO Tim Cook in May 2025:

“I said to him: ‘Tim, you’re my friend. You’re coming here with 500bn but now you’re building all over India. I don’t want you building in India.’”

Trump has also announced a $300 billion refinery project involving Reliance in Brownsville, Texas, claiming it would generate thousands of construction and permanent jobs.

He said the proposed 168,000-barrel-per-day refinery at the Port of Brownsville would offset $300 billion in the US trade deficit with India.

Trump’s reference to $300 billion is misleading. The refinery itself is expected to cost around $5 billion. Over 20 years, it would purchase an estimated $125 billion worth of crude oil and produce and sell petroleum products valued at $175 billion, bringing the combined figure to $300 billion.

How this amount would offset the US trade deficit with India is far from clear.

During a recent visit to Jamnagar, where he met billionaire industrialist Mukesh Ambani, US secretary of state Marco Rubio said the bilateral trade agreement was almost ready. Jamnagar is home to Reliance’s refining complex, the largest in the world.

Trump, too, has described the agreement as “pretty close,” adding that it would be “different in kind from others.”

India has meanwhile begun diversifying its economic relationships, accelerating negotiations and agreements with other trading partners.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether India continues to depend too heavily on the US for trade, security and broader strategic considerations.

India’s Misplaced Expectations of the Quad

India has also been rather naive about Trump’s attitude toward the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad.

The February 2025 joint statement said:

“Prime Minister Modi looks forward to hosting President Trump in New Delhi for the Quad leaders’ Summit, ahead of which the leaders will activate new Quad initiatives on shared airlift capacity to support civilian response to natural disasters and maritime patrols to improve interoperability.”

Trump, however, prefers striking deals with China to confronting it. Given the changing balance of power in China’s favor, this may well be the right approach for America.

The Quad’s record offers little evidence that it has hindered China’s plans in the South China Sea. China has continued its aggressive actions against the Philippines while the Quad has largely watched from the sidelines.

Trump evidently agreed to language India wanted without any genuine commitment to its implications.

Another surprise for New Delhi has been Trump’s eagerness to cultivate Pakistan, particularly Field Marshal Asim Munir.

The principal explanation appears to be Pakistan’s willingness to pursue business dealings involving the Trump family.

India has already begun diversifying its trade relationships. As for the proposed BTA with Washington, New Delhi should resist pressure to sign on Trump’s terms, even if that means further delays.

India’s Policy Toward Israel and Iran

The second major error concerns India’s response to the war against Iran launched by Israel and the US on 28 February.

India has been too slow to correct its earlier position of giving Israel virtually unconditional support.

Modi’s visit to Israel on 25 February was a mistake, particularly when no major issue required resolution at the summit level.

Personal chemistry between the two prime ministers appears to have become the principal determinant of bilateral relations. Such excessively personalized diplomacy can damage national interests.

Whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wins the general election scheduled for 27 October or not, the next government is almost certain to continue his aggressive pursuit of what may be described as a Greater Israel policy. This implies continued attacks on neighboring countries and resistance to meaningful progress toward a Palestinian state.

India’s continued support for Israel has caused resentment within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), whose 57 member states represent a substantial bloc within the 193-member United Nations.

India therefore needs to correct its Middle East policy without further delay.

Rethinking Relations With Pakistan

The next error concerns India’s neighborhood policy, particularly its approach to Pakistan.

India’s efforts to portray Pakistan internationally as an exporter of cross-border terrorism have not achieved the desired results, despite Pakistan’s record of supporting such activities. The latest example was the Pahalgam attack on innocent civilians.

New Delhi needs to examine why its diplomatic campaign against Pakistan has failed to produce the intended international response.

More importantly, it must reassess its Pakistan policy in its entirety.

Subordinating foreign policy to domestic political advantage is a mistake. Slogans such as “Talks and terror cannot go together” and “Water and blood cannot flow together” are no substitute for a coherent policy.

Defense minister Rajnath Singh’s boast that Pakistan would be split into four parts suggests a lack of strategic clarity.

Even if such an outcome were desirable, why announce it publicly?

India must also reconsider its present position on the Indus Waters Treaty.

India’s Diplomatic Decision-Making Needs Scrutiny

Finally, India’s foreign policy decision-making process deserves closer examination.

Why did India announce its candidature for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council after Tajikistan had already declared its candidacy and secured support from the OIC?

Tajikistan is seeking a seat for the first time, whereas India has served on the Council eight times, beginning in 1950.

The decision raises questions about the assessment of diplomatic support and the timing of India’s candidature.

To conclude, India should establish a multidisciplinary group to examine objectively the successes and failures of its foreign policy over the past two decades and recommend a better approach.

Such a group should work discreetly, without any public announcement of its formation.

Effective diplomacy often requires a degree of secrecy.